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Review
Balkan Genocides: Holocaust and Ethnic
Cleansing in the Twentieth Century
Paul Mojzes. Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto and Plymouth:
Rowman and Littlefield, 2011. 299 pp.

Marko A. Hoare*
The sudden explosion of interest in genocide as a topic of academic study over the past
decade or so has involved academics rushing to produce “big” general theories in their
efforts to have their voices heard. But more often than not, their haste has produced
books that are insufficiently researched and theses that strain to be profound. In Balkan
Genocides: Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century, Paul Mojzes has
attempted something more moderately ambitious: an overview of the Balkan genocides
of the twentieth century, focusing principally on the territory of the former Yugoslavia
but involving forays into other Balkan lands, including Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey.
This is a project that needs to be undertaken, as the mass killings of the 1990s in the
former Yugoslavia (the ones that, alongside the concurrent genocide in Rwanda, were
responsible for the explosion in “genocide studies” in the first place) are too often
analysed without a broader chronological framework. In other words, although scholars
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and journalists writing about the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s have frequently made
reference to the prior episodes of mass killing in the region, particularly those that took
place during World War II, their analytical frameworks have tended not to encompass
those earlier episodes. Mojzes has attempted to break the mould, and his book analyses
the mass killings of the 1940s and 1990s as well as those that occurred during the Balkan
Wars of 1912–13. He therefore provides an analytical overview for the English language
reader that is more accessible than elsewhere. Unfortunately, the book he has produced
suffers from some of the same flaws that have marred the more general studies of
genocide alluded to here.
To begin with, the bibliography upon which this book is based is thin. For
example, the major works on the Ustasha movement and regime by Bogdan Krizman and
Fikreta Jelic-Butic have not been consulted; nor have the two groundbreaking works on
Yugoslav collaborationist and quisling movements by Jozo Tomasevich; nor other major
English-language works on the Chetniks by Lucien Karchmar and Matteo Milazzo; nor
Tomislav Dulic’s pioneering comparative study of the Ustasha and Chetnik mass killings.
For the 1990s conflicts, the omissions from Mojzes’s bibliography include the wellresearched works by Bosnian historians Smail Cekic and Edina Becirevic and Isabelle
Wesselingh’s and Arnaud Vaulerin’s study of Prijedor—the epicentre of the genocide in
western Bosnia. Although Mojzes’s book draws sweeping conclusions about the
Srebrenica massacre of 1995 and the Kosovo war of the late 1990s, the now-classic
works on Srebrenica by David Rohde and on Kosovo by Noel Malcolm and Julie Mertus
have not been consulted. Leon Trotsky’s classic journalistic account of the Balkan Wars
has been cited (96)—but only second-hand, via British journalist Tim Judah.
Thus, the (almost entirely secondary) sources upon which Mojzes bases his
conclusions are too limited for the latter to be very profound. The book gives undue space
to discussing the frequently banal conclusions of second-rate English-language writers—
many of them journalists or non-specialists—instead of to actually explaining why the
episodes of mass killings occurred. Mojzes is frank in his eschewal of “either-or”
conclusions about the wars and massacres; he correctly notes, for example, that the wars
of the 1990s were both civil wars and wars of aggression, not just one or the other (142).
But he often rests content with reaching such compromises on definitions rather than
attempting actual explanations. He argues that the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina of the
1990s was caused both by “ancient ethnic hatreds” and by “contemporary political

Balkan Genocides: Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing 233
ambitions of leaders” (137), but does not actually say how these combined to produce the
bloodshed.
In determinedly rejecting “either-or” explanations and trying to be even-handed,
Mojzes sometimes appears to be trying to have his cake and eat it. Thus, he states “I do
not accept the argument that raping was the specific ethnic characteristic of one nation
(usually ascribed to the Serbs) or that somehow women of one ethnicity suffered more
uniquely than others (usually ascribed to Bosniak women, because they are Muslims)”
(185). Yet on the following page: “The vast majority of the cases seem to be Serb men
raping Bosniak and (less frequently) Croatian women; later in Kosovo, it was Serb men
raping ethnic Albanian women” (186). The contradiction is not resolved.
Similarly, Mojzes notes that following the launch of Croatia’s Operation Storm
in August 1995, “the Serbs were ordered by their command to withdraw, and an
enormous exodus took place as approximately 200,000 Serbs left the entire Krajina
region on short notice” and “the Croatian forces permitted this exodus” (156). This would
seem to place Mojzes among those who accept the mainstream Croatian explanation of
why the Serb civilian population left the so-called Krajina. Yet he then concludes:
“During Operation Storm at the end of the war, the Croatian government forces drove out
nearly the entire Serb population of Croatia, numbering between 200,000 and 300,000…
When such a large community (about 12–15 percent of Croatia’s population) is
completely expelled from a country, even if not accompanied by a massive bloodbath—it
is genocide” (162)—hence endorsing the mainstream Serbian explanation.
In a further twist, he subsequently explicitly denies that the Serbian killing of
over 10,000 and expulsion of over 800,000 Kosovo Albanians at the end of the 1990s
constituted genocide (212), though by the definition he used for Operation Storm, it
should. Yet he then says of the Albanian “reverse ethnic cleansing” of Serbs from
Kosovo following the NATO victory: “The conclusion is that genocide had taken place,
parallel to the disappearance of the Serbs from Croatia” (218). Over Kosovo, Mojzes
loses any pretence of even-handedness, and relies for his case on the works of Diana
Johnstone and David N. Gibbs—authors with little credibility as experts on the former
Yugoslavia, who interpret the war in terms of Western victimisation of an unfairly
demonised Serbia.
Another case of the author’s confusion concerns the record of international
justice. Mojzes glowingly concludes that “the ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for
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the former Yugoslavia] has been successful in apprehending and judging all of the main
accused…. The perpetrators are liable to judgement in international or domestic courts no
matter how long they hid, whenever and where ever [sic] they are caught—till the end of
their days” (229). Yet he had earlier complained that, as regards the ‘genocide’ carried
out by Albanians against Serbs in 1999, “There seems to be no political will at the UN or
in the European community to try such cases…. The ICTY disproportionately punished
Serbian civil, army, and police officials who were in command posts trying to quell the
KLA rebellion but did not punish the commanders of the KLA who engaged in
comparable violence” (218). He then lists a similar number of Serb and Albanian
suspects prosecuted by the ICTY for war-crimes in Kosovo, pointing out that the
Albanian suspects were largely acquitted (219)—something he attributes primarily to
witness intimidation (226–27). A more credible explanation might be that, far from being
biased in favour of prosecuting Serbs rather than Albanians, the ICTY prosecution bent
over backwards to be even-handed and indicted similar numbers of suspects from each
side, but simply did not have strong cases against the Albanians.
Mojzes indeed seems reluctant to modify his interpretations when they are
contradicted by the judicial verdict. Thus, he claims: “The forces under the command of
Naser Oric destroyed about fifty Serb villages near Srebrenica, where they carried out
massacres and expelled thousands of Serbs from his homes.” His source for this is the
ICTY’s indictment of Oric, despite the fact that Oric was eventually acquitted of all
charges, which Mojzes puts down to there having been “inadequate legal proof” of his
guilt (169). Yet Oric’s acquittal should call into question Mojzes’s portrayal of the
Srebrenica massacre as retaliation for earlier Bosnian army raids on Serb territory (178–
81).
Thus, although it is gratifying to see all three principal genocidal episodes of the
twentieth century in the region treated together, Mojzes has not succeeded in providing
either a coherent historical narrative that links them, or in judging and categorising them
by consistent criteria. To this should be added a somewhat uncertain factual grasp: it is
untrue, for example, that the Ustashas presented themselves as “ultra-Catholics” (52—
among other things, they opened a mosque in Zagreb); or that Yugoslavia’s inception was
in 1919 (132); or that the so-called Krajina comprised “Lika, Banija and Kordun” (153);
or that the war in Croatia ended in 1996 (135); or that Kosovo declared independence in
2007 (216); or that Gojko Susak was indicted by the ICTY (224).
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A more serious problem is that, by stressing local “ethnic” factors to explain the
outbreak of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, Mojzes greatly downplays the responsibility
of the regime of Slobodan Milosevic. He claims that the Serbs carried out a “preemptive
military action” in Croatia and Bosnia to prevent a feared genocide at the hands of the
Croats and Bosniaks, and claims “Had the international community forced Slovenia and
Croatia and subsequently BH to guarantee minority rights prior to having their right to
self-determination confirmed with international recognition, it is possible that the Serb
population living in the other republics would not have responded militarily to the
propaganda emanating from Milosevic, Babic, Martic, Karadzic, Mladic and other Serb
chauvinist leaders” (141). Yet the Serb rebels in Croatia and Bosnia did not simply
“respond” to “propaganda” from Serb leaders; they were armed and organised by
Serbia’s security services, and their armed rebellion in Croatia was already well
underway by August 1990—well over a year before the international community
recognised Croatia’s independence. Likewise, Mojzes’s claim that the JNA “sought to
prevent secession” (141) is untrue; as the top JNA commander Veljko Kadijevic has
admitted in his memoirs, the JNA was from the spring of 1990 working to facilitate
Croatia’s and Slovenia’s exit from Yugoslavia.
In conclusion, Mojzes has fallen into an old trap for those writing about the
former Yugoslavia: he views its history primarily in ethnic terms, so instead of trying to
understand, for example, the Ustashas and Chetniks or the regimes of Slobodan
Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman as historical phenomena in their own right, he
essentialises them simply as Croat/Serb and as murderous—as if that is all a scholar
needs to do. Thus, he is led away from attempting coherent historical explanations, in
favour of an exercise in judging the different ethnic groups and attempting to spread
around the blame for the mass killings in an “even-handed” manner. Yet until scholars
stop viewing former-Yugoslav history purely in terms of “Bosniaks vs Croats vs Serbs vs
Albanians,” and begin to search for the historical processes themselves, they will not be
able to explain the mass killings.

